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CHAPTER 18 
State and Municipal Government 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. STATE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 
§18.1. Organization of state government. A large number of stat-
utes were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year that made changes in 
the structure and functions of the state government and its various 
offices and units. A number of changes are too minor to note but 
several are of considerable importance. 
With few exceptions most persons believe that a major deficiency 
in the government of the Commonwealth lies in the limitations upon 
the Governor's powers. At the time the state Constitution was adopted. 
the prevailing tradition favored a relatively weak executive and a 
strong legislature. Modem concepts of efficient government have 
tended. particularly on the national level. to increase executive power 
at the expense of the legislative. It is not difficult. and may even be 
correct. to equate national and state needs. At least. various attempts 
have been made to create a more efficient administrative structure for 
the Governor's office. although these changes have only increased guber-
natorial power indirectly. Thus. in 1922. the Commission of Adminis-
tration and Finance was created to aid in handling the financial affairs 
of the Commonwealth. including budgeting and purchasing proce· 
dures. In Acts of 1962. c. 757. the commission is replaced by an execu· 
tive office for administration and finance. under a single commissioner. 
This office has. in addition to the financial budgeting and purchasing 
powers of the original commission. been given somewhat greater powers 
over the budgeting and administration of all of the executive divisions 
of the state government. The state superintendent of buildings will 
serve as head of the Bureau of State Buildings within the executive 
office for administration and finance. The act makes numerous changes 
in various chapters of the General Laws to conform them to the new 
organization.1 The new act generally improves administrative prac-
tice without increasing executive powers. but a more efficient execu-
tive. not bogged down with inefficient administration. will free the 
RiCHARD G. HUBER is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and Editor 
in Chief of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§18.1. 1 Most of the changes are to Chapter 7. which set up the Commission on 
Finance and Administration and, under the new act, is the chapter governing the 
newly created executive office. 
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Governor for other functions while still keeping him better informed 
upon the actual state of executive administration. The act represents 
a step, thus, toward increasing gubernatorial power. 
Acts of 1962, c. 68, sets out, in new Section 2A of G.L., c. 4, the 
powers and duties of special commissions established to make an in-
vestigation and study of any matter. Unless exempted from any pro-
visions of the section, it will govern the activities of commissions and 
provide a desirable certainty as to their powers and duties. 
The recent Cuban crisis again has pointed out the problems of con-
tinuity of state government in the event of enemy attack. Acts of 
1962, c. 767, requires that each of the major officials of the Common-
wealth designate five persons in his unit who, successively, would carry 
out the appointer's duties in the event of his absence or disability. 
The designees must be approved by the Governor and Council. If 
enemy attack prevents a quorum of the executive Council from meet-
ing, the Governor may temporarily appoint and remove officials who 
are subject to his usual appointment and removal powers with Coun-
cil consent. 
Resolves of 1962, c. 146, created a Crime Commission which is given 
broad powers to investigate crime within the Commonwealth. The 
Bureau of Corporate Organization and Registration in the Depart-
ment of Corporations and Taxation was abolished, effective January 1, 
1963, by Acts of 1962, c. 750. Its functions will be assumed by the 
corporation division in the State Secretary's office. Acts of 1962, c. 652, 
created a Division on Civil Rights and Liberties in the Attorney Gen-
eral's office. This act thus gave legislative confirmation of the position 
that Attorney General McCormack had maintained in his office. The 
Attorney General's office was also designated to receive the reports of 
various charities required under Acts of 1962, c. 425. 
§18.2. Code of ethics. A new Chapter 268A of the General Laws 
was adopted by Acts of 1962, c. 779, to replace the previous code of 
ethics for public employees adopted by Acts of 1961, c. 610. Admit-
tedly, a legislative code of ethics cannot solve problems of morality 
and criminality among public employees; it can furnish a guide, how-
ever, that can often be of considerable assistance to an individual em-
ployee who wishes to conform to appropriate ethical standards but 
who would be uncertain, in the absence of the statute, as to what be-
havior is expected of him. In addition, of course, a code of ethics can 
set forth certain detailed, exactly defined standards, violation of which 
will subject the offender to criminal punishment, and offenders can 
include not only the public employees but also those who act as the 
corrupters. The new code of ethics is designed to accomplish these 
various purposes. 
Two basic solutions to the problem of public ethics have been 
adopted in this country. In some few cases, an absolute prohibition 
of all types of activity that bear even slightly upon the public em-
ployees' functions has been imposed. This, for example, has been the 
standard traditionally imposed upon former military officers. This 
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approach has but one real advantage, that of insuring the appearance 
and generally the reality of any possible conflict of interests. But this 
solution is unfair to present and former public employees in many 
types of situations. Some dependence should be put upon the public 
officials themselves; the code thus designed may be less likely to insure 
the appearance of absolute integrity but, if well designed, will insure 
the reality of it as much as any absolute prohibition of all activity. 
The legislature wisely has adopted the latter course, and so the code 
attempts, on the whole successfully, to circumscribe the activities of 
public employees. Violations of the standards specifically set for state, 
county and municipal employees, as well as those in a business and 
family relationship with them, are criminally punishable and, in cer-
tain cases, civil liability also exists, as well as the power to rescind and 
cancel arrangements entered into because of improper influence. The 
code wisely permits the employee to receive an opinion on the validity 
of proposed activity from the appropriate officers, the Attorney Gen-
eral, the county commissioners, corporation counsel, city solicitor or 
town counsel. In addition to the specific prohibitions of the code, 
Section 23 sets out "standards of conduct" for public employees, the 
violation of which will subject the offender to appropriate adminis-
trative action. 
The present code represents a substantial improvement over the one 
adopted in 1961. While undoubtedly not perfect or complete, this 
code is sufficiently sound so that changes found necessary can be read-
ily made by later amendment. If a code of ethics is recognized for 
what it must and can only be, a guide and not insurance against vio-
lation or the appearance of violation, the new code is excellent. 
Closely related to the code of ethics legislation, Acts of 1962, c. 633, 
adds a new Section 9A to G.L., c. 268, forbidding testimonial dinners 
for officials other than elective, whose duties involve law enforcement. 
§18.3. Cultural and historic assets. Resolves of 1962, c. 115, sets 
up an unpaid advisory commission with the functions of setting up 
a program for inventorying the historical and cultural assets of the 
Commonwealth, and of recommending which state agencies should 
have authority over these various assets and which should be acquired 
and managed by the Commonwealth. Rather too often Massachusetts 
citizens forget that the state offers a distinctive and satisfying way of 
life, for which the historical and cultural assets, and the tradition they 
represent, are largely responsible. The particular "climate for living" 
is as important an attribute of the state as its business climate or po-
litical climate. The best aspects of these climates must be retained, 
and the present commission represents an initial and vital first step 
in an important area. 
§18.4. Federal tax levy: Liability of Commonwealth. In Common-
wealth of Massachusetts v. United States 1 the Federal Government 
successfully obtained judgments against the former State Treasurer 
and the Commonwealth for the amounts remaining owing upon 
§18.4. 1296 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1961). 
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accounts for unpaid income taxes of state employees. The Federal 
Government had served notice of levy upon the State Treasurer, who 
refused to honor them and paid their salaries to the employees. The 
treasurer's personal liability was held settled by Sims v. United States,2 
involving a similar suit against the state treasurer of West Virginia. 
The issue of whether the Commonwealth was liable was not directly 
settled by the Sims case, but the United States Supreme Court had 
said that "the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and 
the executive interpretation, i.e., the legislative environment, of [the 
statute] make it plain that Congress intended to and did include States 
within the term 'person' as used in [the statute]." This statement was 
considered decisive as to the Commonwealth's liability. 
§18.5. Charges of misconduct. Two statutes adopted during the 
1962 SURVEY year relate to different aspects of alleged misconduct. 
Acts of 1962, c. 798, authorizes the appointing authority of a depart-
ment, board, commission or agency of the Commonwealth to suspend, 
if desired, any person employed within the unit for any period during 
which this person is under indictment for misconduct in his office or 
employment. Salary and benefits are not paid during the suspension, 
but amounts withheld are to be later paid if the person suspended is 
not found guilty of the charges against him. As a major change in 
policy, the statute provides that any person who retires while under 
suspension is not entitled to pension or retirement benefits but his 
own contributions are to be returned to him. 
If an employee of the state or any subdivision thereof has incurred 
expenses in defending himself against an unwarranted discharge, re-
moval, suspension, lowering in rank, or similar position changes, G.L., 
c. 31, §43(h), provides for reimbursement. Acts of 1962, c. 776, 
amended the section in some important details. The employee gets 
no reimbursement except when he has employed an attorney to de-
fend him. The amount is limited to a total of $900 in place of an 
amount computed upon the basis of the employee's salary. Additional 
sums are authorized for certain administrative and district court hear-
ings, and for fees and expenses necessary to the defense. Payment 
must be made within thirty days after submission of an application 
which includes satisfactory proof of the expenditures. 
B. MUNICIPAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
§18.6. Enabling acts. In two cases decided during the 1962 SURVEY 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court had to determine if an enabling act 
had been properly accepted by a municipality. Noonan v. Selectmen 
of Brookline1 determined that a vote at the regular representative 
town meeting was effective to accept G.L., c. 41, §25, requiring the 
appointment of assessors. Assessors had been elected up to this time 
2359 U.S. 108,79 Sup. Ct. 641, 3 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1959). 
§18.6. 1343 Mass. 461, 179 N.E.2d 332 (1962). 
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under the provisions of Acts of 1890, c. 386. The statutes were held 
by the Court to require that a change as to the selection of officials 
had to be made at least thirty days prior to the annual town meeting 
at which the change is to be effective, but this did not prevent a change 
at one regular town meeting from becoming effective at the next regu-
lar meeting a year later.2 The Court held, however, that the only 
change made was as to the method of selecting assessors and the num-
ber of assessors remained unchanged. It was the apparent purpose 
of the warrant to change the system from three elected assessors to 
one appointed, full-time assessor, but the vote did not accomplish the 
change in the number of assessors. 
In Minnie v. City of Chicopee8 the contention was rejected that the 
city had not properly accepted G.L., c. 41, §108E, relative to minimum 
pay for police officers. The case provides an interesting study of how 
not to present a case before the Supreme Judicial Court, since it 
required three hearings in the Superior Court involving over nine 
months of time, before the record was adequate to present the deter-
minative issues. The city council, under the statute and the city 
charter, had the power to accept the enabling act and did so in De-
cember, 1959. The mayor returned the order unsigned but without 
noting his objections, so that the act was actually accepted under the 
pertinent laws as of December 21, 1959. 
The city also contended that the acceptance was not effective be-
cause it failed to comply with the provision in the city charter that 
requires that no ordinance changing salaries is effective until an ap-
propriation has been made therefor. The Court properly noted that 
the enabling act set out its own procedure for setting salaries and, in 
the statutory language, governs "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 
any general or special law to the contrary." Restrictions normally 
applicable under G.L., c. 44, §33A, governing salary changes that are 
to be operative for less than three months during the municipality'S 
financial year, were also not applicable since superseded by the par-
ticular statute. Thus the city had to appropriate the funds necessary 
to pay the salary increases from December 21, 1959, the effective date 
of acceptance of the enabling act. 
General Laws, c. 4, §4, setting out the procedure for acceptance by 
a city or town of a statute, was modified by Acts of 1962, c. 182, to 
establish as general law the type of provisions now conventionally in-
serted into each enabling act. It makes acceptance by a city by the 
council subject to the appropriate city charter provisions, and clarifies 
acceptance by town meeting to include vote by representative town 
meeting. 
Commonwealth v. Dobbins4 required that the Court determine if 
the local parking law was authorized by an enabling act. General 
Laws, c. 40, §22, broadly gives power to a municipality to regulate 
2 The pertinent statutes were C.L.. c. 41. §§2. 7. and Acts of 1890. c. 586. §2. 
3 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1261. 184 N.E.2d 525. 
4, 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705. 182 N.E.2d 125. 
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"carriages and vehicles used therein," and has existed for many years, 
long before automobiles came into existence. By Acts of 1956, c. 509, 
however, G.L., c. 40, §2l(2l), authorized municipal regulation of "park-
ing of any motor vehicle in front of any dwelling house except by 
the occupant" and directing that signs giving notice be posted. The 
Court rejected the defendant's contention that the earlier, broad grant 
was impliedly limited by the later, specific act. While confessing it 
could find no purpose nor function in the adoption of the later spe-
cific act, the Court was unwilling to decide that it limited the earlier 
act, since much necessary and standard regulation of parking exists 
under the authority of the earlier statute. The Court admittedly had 
a most peculiar problem of statutory construction before it. A spe-
cific later act would normally govern over a general and older act, and 
yet the limitations this would impose upon parking regulation in resi-
dential areas would be almost nonsensical. The newer act was al-
most certainly adopted without any consideration being given as to 
the existence of the older act and thus may be considered merely a 
legislative aberration. 
§18.7. By-laws: Validation. In Loriol v. Keene l the Supreme Judi-
cial Court determined that an attempt by the General Court to vali-
date all acts of the selectmen of the town of Burlington relative to 
actions as to highways and ways was ineffective to validate the accept-
ance of a way by the town. The way involved admittedly had not 
been accepted under the provisions of G.L., c. 82, §§22 and 23. The 
special act could not be read to regularize other than minor, pro-
cedural irregularities in acts of the selectmen, and the notice and the 
layout requirements of the governing statute were indispensable con-
ditions for dedication. Curative statutes that are designed to affect 
personal or property rights must be precise and clear, particularly 
when governmental action may involve exercise of eminent domain 
power. To read the curative act as validating all acts of the selectmen 
in this subject area, and not just the ambiguous 1931 town vote on 
the claimed public way, would be unreasonable. The repeal of so 
many sections of Chapters 79, 80 and 82 as to the town would raise 
serious constitutional issues if the curative act were interpreted to vali-
date more than minor procedural informalities. 
As the Court most properly notes, the expectation of municipalities 
that they could ignore substantive requirements of statutes over a pe-
riod of many years and then expect the General Court to validate 
their improper actions "is hardly conducive to the maintenance of the 
orderly processes of government." Failure to act within statutory au-
thority, as well as failure to act at all, should ordinarily carry the 
same result. It is not improper nor overly technical to require that 
municipalities act within their authority.2 
§18.7. 1 M3 Mass. 358,179 N.E.2d 223 (1961). 
2 Two cases concerned with the adoption of zoning ordinances and by-laws were 
governed by the provisions of Chapter 40A of the General Laws and are conse-
quently discussed in §13.1 supra. 
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§18.8. Municipal home rule. The fact that Massachusetts, the 
traditional home of the town meeting, has in reality very little home 
rule for its cities and towns has been a source of continuing if largely 
ineffective dissatisfaction. Resolves of 1962, c. 102, continues the spe-
cial commission studying home rule. While hope may spring eternal, 
there is little likelihood that the General Court will severely restrict 
its traditional powers in this area. The public may object, when they 
are informed, to the freezing of municipal employees in their jobs and 
other unhappy cases of interference with local government, but its 
opinion is seldom felt at the legislative level. The publicity concern-
ing the Police Commissioner of Boston did develop sufficient opinion 
during the 1962 SURVEY year to result in the appointing power being 
shifted from the Governor to the Mayor.1 In turn, however, in an 
area which public opinion did not affect, Acts of 1962, c. 350, for ex-
ample, gives the Director of Civil Defense the power to establish stand-
ards for family fallout shelters and exempts these structures from local 
zoning regulations and building codes. Justification for this particu-
lar act, if not for those freezing municipal employees into their posi-
tions, can, of course, be found. This type of legislation, even if 
justifiable, does not, however, auger well for any broad acceptance of 
home rule within the Commonwealth. 
§18.9. Alteration of municipal boundary lines. Some slight ac-
ceptance of the home rule concept can be adduced in the amendments 
to G.L., c. 42, §7, adopted by Acts of 1962, c. 157. As it previously 
existed, the state Department of Public Works could, with the con-
currence of the municipalities affected, propose changes in the bound-
aries between adjoining towns. The new Section 7 gives the authority 
to initiate the proposed changes to the towns themselves, the state 
department's function being limited to insuring engineering accuracy 
and clarity. The General Court, however, still retains the final power 
of disposal and approval of the changes proposed. What general state-
wide public interest exists in any minor changes of this type, sufficient 
to require the consideration of the General Court, is nowhere evident. 
The only possible purpose that can be imagined is that the representa-
tives and senators from the municipalities involved might wish for 
some reason to thwart the local government; this may seem an impor-
tant enough purpose to the members of the General Court but is hardly 
attractive to others. 
§18.10. Municipal employees: Powers and duties. In Finance Com-
mission of Boston v. McGrath,1 the Boston city auctioneer, while un-
der investigation, was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring 
him to produce a number of personal financial records. The Superior 
Court, upon his refusal, ordered him to "produce all records of every 
description pertaining to such matters as are now being investigated." 
The Supreme Judicial Court generally upheld the commission's right 
§18.8. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 322. 
§18.l0. 1343 Mass. 754, 180 N.E.2d 808 (1962). 
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to have the relevant records produced by the employee. Massachu-
setts income tax returns were excluded under the rule of Leave v. 
Boston Elevated Railway.2 The recent case of St. Regis Paper Co. 
v. United States,S however, required a different test as to the produc-
tion of federal income tax records. The Supreme Judicial Court 
interpreted the federal case to permit discovery of these records upon 
a showing of substantial necessity. On the facts of the McGrath case 
no sufficient necessity was shown. The case indicates, generally, that 
investigatory bodies can be given rights to access to nearly all the finan-
cial records of a public employee that may bear upon his conduct in 
public office. 
Two cases relating to charitable trusts were decided during the 1962 
SURVEY year. In Franklin Foundation v. Collector-Treasurer of Bos-
ton,4 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the terms of the Carnegie 
donation to the foundation did not permit the principal of the dona-
tion to be spent for the acquiring of additional land at the site of the 
Franklin Institute. City of Salem v. Attorney General 5 held that a 
devise of land "to be used forever as Public Grounds" did not, in the 
context of the understanding of all parties, permit the use of a por-
tion of the land for a school site. The land had been accepted in 
trust for park purposes. In both cases the officials controlling the trust 
res were required to comply with the limitations imposed by the gift, 
despite the perfectly valid and desirable purposes of the uses they pro-
posed. 
At times it is very desirable that public employees be permitted to 
go on private land. Two statutes adopted during the 1962 SURVEY 
year gave this permission in two differing situations. A new Section 
llA was added to G.L., c. 82, by Acts of 1962, c. 589. The act author-
izes agents and employees of county commissioners to go upon private 
land for necessary surveys and engineering work incident to highways 
and other public projects. Reimbursement for actual injury or dam-
age is required. 
General Laws, c. 148, §5, authorizes fire officials, under certain cir-
cumstances, to make an investigation of conditions that are likely to 
cause fire. Acts of 1962, c. 456, repealed the previous limitation that 
entry could not be made into single-family and two-family dwellings 
without the consent of the occupant. As long as fire danger may exist, 
the former limitation was unwise and its removal promotes both de-
sirable uniformity and preventive fire protection. 
Firefighters were also the subject of Acts of 1962, c. 345, which for-
bids their use as police officers or in other than their regular duties 
during an industrial or labor dispute.6 Acts of 1962, c. 233, amends 
G.L., c. 41, §§13 and 13A, to require that the Commissioner of Cor-
2300 Mass. 391, 398-403, 28 N.E.2d 483, 489-490 (1940). 
3368 U.S. 208, 82 Sup. Ct. 289, 7 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1961). 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1063, 183 N.E.2d 710. 
51962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1125, 183 N.E.2d 859. 
6 Amending C.L., c. 48, §88. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1962 [1962], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1962/iss1/21
232 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.l1 
porations and Taxation set a minimum amount for the bonds of town 
and city clerks; the local governing officials must set bond at at least 
this amount. 
C. ELECTIONS 
§18.1l. Campaign expenses. The General Court extensively re-
vised the laws governing campaign expenditures and contributions 
during the 1962 SURVEY year.1 A more sophisticated and realistic 
definition of campaign contributions was inserted, to include many 
items beyond money contributions. Three political committees per 
candidate are set as a maximum number a candidate may authorize. 
Individual yearly contributions are limited basically to $3000 per can-
didate. Contributions are to be made in a mann that will avoid 
disg~ising t e actu . . t be filed 
in~_Iven orm at t~e end of vario~s re ort~n eriods, and expendi-
tures mustalso __ .~c:_.!!~!.ed. The major candIdates an t eIr potiItcal 
commIttees iiiust appoint a depository for these funds, and contribu-
tions must be deposited within three business days after receipt. The 
new law applies to candidates for nomination 'as well as candidates for 
election. Th..e statute represen_~~ an excellent and basically sound at-
temyt to avoid the dangers that arise from the needs of candidat~!lfor 
~latively large campaign fund~.:. The p()ssilJi!i~i~~.~!!d, more impor-
tan!!)! the appearance().f p(>ssible undue influence or improper ex-
p-~ndifUres-wllllargelfbeavoided. Further sharpening of some fea-
tures of the law will make It even more effective, but the present 
statute represents a major and necessary step forward. 
An initial amendment to the new law was adopted within a month. 
Acts of 1962, c. 518, added, as part of the definition of "combination 
of persons" in G.L., c. 55, §6, the phrase "including a corporation 
formed under the provisions of chapter one hundred and eighty." 
A problem of interpreting Section 7 of the Corrupt Practices Act2 
was determined in Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc.S The plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the defendant corporation from expending funds for contribu-
tions to committees attempting to influence voters against the adop-
tion of the proposed Massachusetts graduated income tax amendment. 
Under Section 7 corporations may expend funds for political contri-
butions only if a question submitted to the voters is "one materially 
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proposed expenditure was 
one permitted under the statute, on the basis that the "question" 
would include the effect upon a corporation'S business and assets of a 
new and potentially more burdensome tax system. Whether the pro-
hibited contributions included the present one is admittedly a very 
close question of statutory interpretation, which the lack of any ade-
§18.11. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 444, amending numerous sections of G.L., c. 55. 
2 G.L., c. 55. 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1151, 18!! N.E.2d 871. 
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quate legislative history made even more difficult of determination. 
The Court's opinion is persuasive but it cannot be, under the circum-
stances, positively correct. The failure of the legislature to provide 
adequate guidelines for the Court is responsible for the feeling one 
has that the result reached may not have been the one actually desired 
by the legislature. 
§18.12. Absentee voting. Several amendments governing absentee 
voting were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 511. 
a lengthy act. sets out the standards for absentee voting by armed 
forces personnel. certain employees of the United States and their de-
pendents. The registration of these persons is also governed by the 
act.1 Other legislation affected minor administrative matters.2 
§18.13. Presidential elections. Acts of 1962. c. 437. amends the 
law relating to voting in presidential elections. Although the require-
ments for voting remain generally at one year's residence in the Com-
monwealth and six months in the town or city of residence. a person 
may vote for presidential electors only. upon proper application. if he 
has resided in the state and municipality for thirty-two days prior to 
the election. The act makes necessary and extensive changes in the 
administrative procedures for registration. voting. protests and other 
matters so as to effectuate this change in residence requirement. 
Resolves of 1962. c. 107. sets up a special commission to study a 
number of proposed bills relative to presidential primaries. pledging 
of presidential convention delegates and requirements of voting in 
presidential elections. 
The desirability of some residential requirements before a person 
may vote in local elections is at least reasonable. if debatable. But 
the accident of change of residence should hardly disqualify a person 
from voting in presidential elections. as the new act recognizes. One 
may well question municipal residential requirements for voting for 
state offices. as long as state residence is proven. Despite the admin-
istrative difficulty, not to say nightmare, in setting up separate systems, 
the importance of voting in a democratic system is so potent that a 
person should be deprived of his vote for only the most compelling of 
reasons.1 
§18.14. Election laws. A number of other statutes affecting elec-
tions were adopted by the General Court during the 1962 SURVEY 
year. some of which deserve noting. Acts of 1962, c. 264, changes the 
time within which a petition for recount in a primary or preliminary 
election must be filed from seven days to three.1 If a municipality 
decides to discontinue the use of voting machines, it must notify the 
§18.l2. 1 The act adds new Sections I03B through 103Q to G.L., c. 54, and 
amends G.L., c. 51, §§50, 51. 
2 Additional changes in the laws relating to absentee voting were adopted by 
Acts of 1962, cc. 265, 267. Both dealt with minor administrative matters. 
§18.13. 1 See comments by Fred W. Fisher, Esq., in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§18.33. 
§IS.J4. 1 Amending G.L., c. 54, §135, 1st par. 
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State Secretary within four days of the action and, under Acts of 1962, 
c. 376, at least thirty days prior to any primary or election.2 Acts of 
1962, c. 315, establishes the new congressional districts for the state 
pursuant to the reduction of the Massachusetts delegation from four-
teen to twelve.s The protracted history of this redistricting is well 
known. The main advantage of the act adopted was that it tended 
to create the least disturbance for the congressional delegation and, as 
proved true in the elections, preserved the two congressional vote ad-
vantage of the Democratic Party. 1£ this motive does not appeal to 
those favoring reduction of gerrymandering, it at least recognized po-
litical realities and assured that elections would not be held at large. 
Acts of 1962, c. 272, amends G.L., c. 53, §34, to remedy an oversight 
when Section 34 was amended by Acts of 1961, c. 261. The provisions 
for the arrangement and form of the ballot in primaries are made 
applicable to preliminary elections in cities unless charter provisions 
govern. Acts of 1962, c. 358, amends G.L., c. 54, §43A, so that the 
office of Attorney General immediately follows the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor on ballots and voting machine labels. The Attorney General's 
position was advanced over the next three constitutional officers of the 
Commonwealth. 
§18.15. Municipal elections. Acts of 1962, c. 260, amended G.L., 
c. 51, §19, to clarify provisions concerning removal of a registrar of 
voters when the political parties are unequally represented on the 
board. The registrar to be removed to avoid excess representation of 
one political party is the one whose remaining term is the shorter. 
Election officers in towns are appointed from lists submitted to the 
local appointing agencies. Acts of 1962, c. 266, amends G.L., c. 54, 
§12, to provide that if the usual appointing agency, the board of select-
men, does not act within the prescribed period, the appointments are 
to be made by the board of registrars of voters. 
Two changes concerning nomination papers for city and town pri-
maries were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 249, 
requires that, if the statute is accepted by a city or town, nomination 
papers to be issued are limited to those that will contain five times 
the signatures required for nomination. The papers must be taken 
out by the candidate or a person specifically authorized by the candi-
date, indicating the post for which election is sought and the address 
of the candidate.! Acts of 1962, c. 269, amends G.L., c. 53, §59, to re-
quire that only one candidate be listed on nomination papers in cities, 
although the prior provision that the names of candidates equal to the 
number of offices to be filled may still be used upon nomination papers 
for town offices.2 
A biennial census of enrolled and unenrolled voters is henceforth 
2 Amending id. §34. 
S Amending id., c. 57, §1. 
§18.15. ! This act adds a new Section 9A to C.L., c. 53, and amends Sections 17 
and 58 of the chapter. 
2 General Laws, c. 53, §60, is amended to conform to the new requirement. 
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to be submitted to the State Secretary by the various local boards of 
registrars of voters. The State Secretary is required to issue a report 
on this census.3 City and town clerks may now destroy voting lists 
after tW(i' years, rather than the five years previously required.4 
D. FINANCE 
§18.16. Salaries of members of General Court: Referendum. 
Murray v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,! a petition for a writ of 
mandamus, sought to require the respondent to distribute ballots for 
the November, 1962, election that did not include as a referendum 
question the repeal or retention of the act increasing the salaries of 
members of the General Court.2 The salary act was adopted November 
23, 1960, and was made effective by emergency preamble as of January 
4, 1961. The present petition contended that the salary act was an 
appropriation law which, under Amendment Article 48 of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, is not subject to referendum. 
The Court rejected the contention. It first noted that the emer-
gency preamble would have been unnecessary, under Amendment 
Article 48, if the act had been an appropriation bill. The Court also 
noted that Amendment Article 63, §3, speaks of the General Court 
providing for its "salaries, mileage, and expenses and for necessary 
expenditures in anticipation of appropriations .... " This section 
indicates that the General Court can make provision for its own sala-
ries "in anticipation of appropriations" and that this provision need 
not, at least necessarily, be in form or in substance an appropriation. 
Thus the 1960 salary bill did not need to be an appropriation bill. 
The Court determined that the bill was not an appropriation, the 
necessary appropriation for these salary increases being adopted by 
another act enacted later the same day.3 The distinction between 
fixing salaries and appropriating money for their payment is long-
standing in the Commonwealth.4 The Court thus dismissed the peti-
tion and, as is known, the referendum was submitted to the voters, who 
rejected the salary raise act. 
§18.17. Municipal finance. Much municipal finance relates to the 
problem of municipal taxation, which is covered in another chapter 
of the SURVEY.! Certain legislation concerning finances should, how-
ever, be noted. General Laws, c. 44, §53, has provided that moneys 
received by towns and certain districts are to be turned into their 
respective treasuries and, except for highways and several other pur-
3 Acts of 1962, c. 375, inserted a new Section 3BA to G.L., c. 53. 
4 Acts of 1962, c. 343, amending G.L., c. 54, §109. 
§IB.16. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, IB4 N.E.2d 336. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 7B3. 
8 Id., c. 7B6. 
4 The Court cited two Opinions of the Justices, 323 Mass. 764, 79 N.E.2d BBI 
(194B); 309 Mass. 571, 34 N.E.2d 527 (1941). 
§lB.17. 1 See Chapter 17. 
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poses, are not to be disbursed except upon specific appropriation. 
Acts of 1962, c. 246, extended the provisions of this section to cities. 
General Laws, c. 44, §7, setting forth the purposes for the borrowing 
of money within the debt limit, was amended by Acts of 1962, c.380, to 
permit cities and towns to make a single appropriation of twenty-five 
cents for one thousand of assessed valuation (in Boston ten cents) for 
road and sidewalk repair and construction and work on walks and 
curbings. 
Acts of 1962, c. 257, liberalized the investment of large trust funds 
held by municipalities other than Boston. If the aggregate of these 
trust funds exceeds $2 million, G.L., c. 44, §54, now permits invest-
ment in securities, other than mortgages and collateral loans, that are 
legal for savings bank investment. A limitation on bank and in-
surance company stocks to a total of 15 percent of the trust funds, no 
more than .5 percent to be in anyone institution, is also imposed. 
General Laws, c. 44, §63, sets out the purposes for which funds re-
ceived on the sale or other disposal of real estate owned by a munici-
pality can be used. Acts of 1962, c. 377, amended the section to state 
specifically that the provisions of the section apply to proceeds received 
from the taking of municipal property by another government unit 
under eminent domain. 
Acts of 1961, c. 450, further amended Acts of 1933, c. 49, creating 
the Emergency Finance Board and setting out the provisions for bor-
rowing funds by municipalities from the Commonwealth, to permit 
somewhat broader borrowing. The hl.w was further amended by Acts 
of 1962, c. 538, relating to the State Treasurer's power to extend the 
final maturity of notes issued under Acts of 1962, c. 450. Acts of 1962, 
c. 502, authorizes cities and towns to borrow for public welfare or 
veterans' benefits expenditures, subject to the Emergency Finance 
Board law. 
E. PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
§18.18. Larceny by false pretenses. Two cases decided during the 
1962 SURVEY year related to convictions for larceny by false pretenses 
from the Commonwealth by those who had entered into a contractual 
relationship with the Metropolitan District Commission. In Common-
wealth v. Louis Construction Co., 1 the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the verdicts of guilty against the defendants. The case arose 
out of the bills submitted for dismantling a summer theatre tent roof. 
The supporting bills for the total charge included a duplicate bill for 
labor of the same men and an overcharge on the insurance premiums 
which occurred because of a change in the rate after the policy was 
initially issued and after the basic bill had been submitted. The 
Court noted that. the evidence was as likely to be explainable on the 
basis of careless checking as upon any intent to defraud, and the evi-
dence as a whole could not support an intent to defraud beyond a 
§18.18. 1343 Mass. 600, ISO N.E.2d 83 (1962). 
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reasonable doubt. The question of guilt was left to surmise and the 
verdict could not stand. The Court stated that the Commonwealth's 
remedy is civil to recover the several hundred dollars of overcharges. 
In Commonwealth v. Iannell02 the conviction of one of the de-
fendants was sustained and that of the other reversed. The evidence 
at the trial showed that the defendant Charles Iannello signed vouch-
ers stating that the sidewalk repairs contracted for were completed, 
Iannello signing the name of his wife. The Court found that the 
statement was false and that the jury could find it was made by the 
defendant husband knowing it to be false. The necessary intent that 
the false statement be relied upon, which was a basis for the reversal 
in the Louis case, was found to be existent in the Iannello case, at 
least to the extent that a jury finding of this intent was based on sound 
evidence. Other contentions were resolved against Iannello, but the 
Court found his wife's conviction could not stand. There was no 
proof of her knowledge of the falsity of the statements made by her 
or in her name, and her husband's knowledge could not by virtue of 
their relationship be imputed to her. 
By Resolves of 1962, c. 37, the Judicial Council was directed to re-
port on a house document that would provide, if adopted, that a con-
tractor who diverts funds is guilty of larceny. It may be desirable that 
a separate statutory criminal code be set up to govern the relationship 
of contractor and Commonwealth. This may not be needed for the 
purpose of changing criminal liability, but the greater precision pos-
sible in a carefully drafted act devoted to this sole relationship might 
clarify areas of doubt as yet unsettled by general statutes and the de-
cisions interpreting them. 
§18.19. Recovery upon failure to make payments. In Marinucci 
Bros. & Co. v. Semper Construction CO.,l the plaintiff sought to re-
cover upon a subcontractor's bond, the subcontractor having failed 
to pay several of its own subcontractors. The bond furnished by the 
original subcontractor required notice within a defined ninety days 
and suit within a year after the subcontractor ceased work under the 
contract. These conditions were not fulfilled and the plaintiff did 
not join any claimants under the subcontractor's bond, as was neces-
sary if it was to require enforcement of the bond rights. Marinucci 
was therefore liable upon its statutory bond, under the law then appli-
cable,2 and did not have recourse over against the subcontractor's 
bond. 
Pioneer Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Commonwealth3 was a proceeding 
by an unpaid subcontractor under a highway project for recovery from 
the Commonwealth of the amount owed. General Laws, c. 30, §39F, 
provides in substance that if a subcontractor has not received payment, 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1241, 184 N.E.2d 1164. 
§18.l9. 111411 Mass. 7118, 180 N.E.2d 6811 (1962). 
2 The applicable statute, G.L., c. 110, §1I9, was repealed by Acts of 1957, c. 682, 
and the bond liability of contractors is now governed by G.L., c. 149, §29. 
s 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607,181 N.E.2d 670. 
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less certain retentions, within a period of time after it has completed 
its work, the awarding authority is to pay the amount out of sums 
it owes the general contractor. The Commonwealth contended this 
obligation was not of a kind for which, under G.L., c. 258, it had con-
sented to be sued. The Court held, however, that this contention was 
without merit. The claim was for services rendered and materials 
furnished, which is a type of claim governments consistently recognize. 
The Court considered that Nash v. Commonwealth4 basically con-
trolled on the controverted issues; the fact that the claim was not a 
direct obligation of the Commonwealth to the subcontractor was, re-
ferring to Nash, resolved by the holding that the Commonwealth held 
the funds as trustee for the subcontractor. The Court further rejected 
the state's argument based upon a change in the specified security for 
payment of subcontractors to a surety bond alone, under G.L., c. 149, 
§29, whereas prior to 1957, it was based upon a bond or other security 
under G.L., c. 30, §39. The Court believed this did not reject the 
right under Section 39F, and just means that recovery against retained 
funds can now be attained only under this section. In the absence 
of express reference to its sovereign immunity, the intent to provide 
for payments of this type creates an obligation for which the Com-
monwealth may be sued. 
§18.20. Public works of Commonwealth: Effect of local regulation. 
Under a contract to build a part of an interstate highway, the de-
fendant contractor in City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & CO.l em-
ployed the defendant Boston and Maine Railroad to transport neces-
sary fill to a location within the plaintiff city. The plaintiff city 
sought to prevent the contractor from building and using storage and 
operating facilities for the fill, and to prevent the railroad from using 
its trackage and equipment to deliver and dump the fill, upon the 
authority of its zoning ordinances and building code. The Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected the city's theories, largely upon the basis of 
Teasdale v. Newell & Snowling Construction CO.,2 in which the Court 
had held that a general law for the regulation of citizens does not 
apply to a use of property by the Commonwealth under a specific 
statute giving it power to act to carry out the purposes for which the 
land is designated. Marinucci, although not the Commonwealth, was 
the agent through which the state acted in carrying out this essential 
highway building function. Thus it was not bound by the single 
residence zoning limitation or by its failure to obtain building permits 
for the hoppers used in unloading the fill. 
The contractual requirement between Marinucci and the Common-
wealth required the contractor to comply with all municipal ordi-
nances and regulations. The Court pointed out that this obligation, 
even if possibly enforceable by the city, who was not a party to the 
contract, "did not contemplate compliance with municipal ordinances 
4174 Mass. 335, 54 N.E. 865 (1899). 
§18.20. ll962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 453. 181 N.E.2d 584. 
2192 Mass. 440. 78 N.E. 504 (1906). 
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and regulations which would be otherwise inapplicable to the con-
tractor in land of the Commonwealth, and which would frustrate, or 
even only hinder, performance of the contract." This limitation upon 
the coverage of the contractual provision makes new law, and emi-
nently reasonable law, in the state. As a matter of state policy, it is 
certain that the state should not be considered as having made the 
carrying out of its function difficult or impossible unless this intent is 
clearlyexpressed.3 
§18.21. Municipal contracts. The Supreme Judicial Court decided 
three cases relating to municipal contracts during the 1962 SURVEY 
year. In Deary v. Town of Dudley1 the town awarded a contract for 
a new sewer to the higher of two responsible bidders. The local by-
law only provided for advertisement for proposals, and the particular 
advertisement involved in this case reserved to the town the right to 
reject any or all proposals. The Court held that the lower court 
properly sustained a demurrer to this petition of fifteen taxable in-
habitants. In the absence of provisions that require contracts to be 
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, the appropriate municipal 
officers, exercising reasonable judgment, may accept any proposal. The 
Court stated that G.L., c. 149, §44A, requiring contracts for public 
buildings to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, did not 
apply since the sewer in the present case was not a "building" under 
the statute. 
Water Works Supply Corp. v. Cahill2 involved the rights of sub-
contractors of a bankrupt contractor against the statutory bond. The 
original complaint sought recovery from the city of Quincy from the 
funds it had retained under the contract and from the bonding com-
pany any balance not payable out of the retained funds. The Su-
preme Judicial Court noted that this type of allegation was correct 
under G.L., c. 149, §29, before its amendment by Acts of 1955, §702, 
but that this amendment caused the bond to become the only statu-
tory security for the benefit of those listed. The petition was properly 
interpreted to be a claim against the statutory security, whatever it 
was, and this security is now limited to the bond. The bonding com-
pany itself might have had certain equitable rights in the funds re-
tained by the city, under G.L., c. 30, §39F.B The company had not, 
however, sought to establish any such rights it may have had, and the 
lower court was not required, even if it had the right to do so, to keep 
the petition alive once the issue raised by the petitioning subcon-
tractors was determined. Dismissal of the suit against the city was, 
therefore, sustained. 
A further issue related to the effect of the amendment of G.L., c. 
a The city's argument against the railroad was decided against the city on zoning 
law grounds. See §13.5 supra. 
§18.21. 1343 Mass. 192. 178 N.E.2d 83 (1961). 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897. 182 N.E.2d 829. 
B See discussion of this section in §18.l9 supra, in noting Pioneer Steel Erectors, 
Inc. v. Commonwealth. 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607,181 N.E.2d 670. 
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149, §29, by Acts of 1957, c. 682, relative to the time creditors had to 
intervene in an action upon the statutory bond. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, studying the 1957 language in the light of the prior 
statutory requirements and the legislative history, determined that 
creditors who had filed within the statutory period did not need to 
intervene in an action against the debtor within a year after the filing, 
which was clearly required by the prior law. Present law requires no 
formal intervention and sets no specific time limit for it. 
§18.22. Legislation. Several statutes governing contracts were 
adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 290, amended 
G.L., c. 8, §lOA, to exempt from the requirements of public bids for 
leases to the Commonwealth, leases of premises owned or under the 
control of the United States or any political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth. Acts of 1962, c. 754, sets out new requirements for those 
authorized to bid upon contracts under the Department of Public 
Works.1 Acts of 1962, c. 662, requires that plans and specifications 
for public buildings include, when feasible, adequate facilities for the 
handicapped. 
General Laws, c. 149, §29, concerns the statutory bonds required in 
all but a few cases of work on public buildings and public works.2 
Acts of 1962, c. 696, amended the section to include within its coverage 
security for transportation charges that may be payable under the 
basic contract for the public construction involved. Thus the extent 
of the statutory bond is to be determined by these transportation costs 
in addition to the numerous other factors that affect it. Transporta-
tion costs involved include those for materials used by the contractor 
and any direct subcontractor, and those involved in the rental and 
hire of construction equipment. The claim for such charges must, in 
general, be given in written form to the contractor within seventy 
days after delivery or, if demurrage charges are involved, within sixty-
three days from the release of the transportation equipment. 
F. PUBLIC WELFARE 
§18.23. Old-age assistance. The liability of a municipality for its 
financial share of old-age assistance depends in most cases upon the 
legal residence of the recipient. In City of Boston v. City of Chelsea1 
the question was whether the now deceased recipient kept her Chelsea 
settlement although she took up residence in a charitable institution 
located in Boston. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the lower 
court's determination that the legal residence remained in Chelsea. 
General Laws, c. 116, §2, provides that a person residing in an incor-
porated charitable institution does not lose his residence. The city 
§18.22. 1 See brief discussion of this new Section 8B of G.L., c. 29, in §18.50 
infra. 
2 The section was important in the decisions in cases noted in §§18.19 and 18.21 
supra. 
§18.23. 1343 Mass. 499,179 N.E.2d 596 (1962). 
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of Chelsea contended, however, that G.L., c. 118A, §l, should control. 
This section, inter alia, provides that assistance shall be given to recip-
ients in, among other places, boarding homes and adds that "any 
person who, while such an inmate, has lost his settlement . . . shall 
be deemed to have no settlement in the commonwealth." The Court, 
certainly correctly, held that the recipient in the present case could 
not lose her settlement in Chelsea under G.L., c. 116, §2, and thus 
G.L., c. 1I8A, §l, had no application. 
Acts of 1962, c. 411, amended the residence requirement for old-age 
assistance in the Commonwealth. The provision of prior law that 
the recipient must have resided in the state for three years during the 
nine-year period immediately preceding application was deleted. It 
is now only required that the recipient have resided in the state for 
one year immediately preceding application.2 This change is de-
sirable since, often, aged persons may have to move to be near rela-
tives or others who can assist them, and undue limitations upon 
assistance work an unnecessary hardship with no valid countervailing 
benefits. The one-year limitation will sufficiently discourage most 
cases of those persons moving just to obtain high benefits. Acts of 
1962, c. 412, amends G.L., c. 1I8A, §8, to provide that continuation 
of assistance to recipients moved to certain hospital and other medical 
care institutions shall be as provided under medical assistance for the 
aged, as adopted by Acts of 1962, c. 781,3 rather than under regular 
old-age assistance. 
Section 2A of G.L., c. 118A, governs the tests in determining a 
child's ability to support an aged parent under old-age assistance. Acts 
of 1962, c. 597, increases the amounts of exempt annual income of 
a child. An employed single child living with the parent now is en-
titled to exempt yearly income of $2450, an employed single child 
living apart from the parent is entitled to $2700, and an employed 
married child living apart is entitled to $4750. The act also amends 
Section 30 of the chapter to conform. The new limits thus recognize 
more reasonable standards of income required by the children liable 
for a portion of their aged parent's aid. 
In Boudakian v. Town of Westport4 the town sought reimburse-
ment from the estate of a deceased recipient of old-age assistance.1> 
The deceased died of injuries received in an accident, and a suit for 
conscious suffering and wrongful death was settled for $12,000. The 
executrix defendant allocated $3500 of the lump sum to the conscious 
suffering count. The estate of the decedent thus only amounted to 
somewhat over $4300. The town had furnished assistance including 
hospital payments during the twenty-five days between the accident 
and death. Under the executrix's account the town would receive no 
reimbursement. The Supreme Judicial Court supported the Probate 
2 Amending G.L., c. USA, §1. 
8 The 1960 act now appears as Sections 13 through 32 of G.L., c. USA. 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 465, lSI N.E.2d 336. 
I> Under G.L., c. USA, §4A. 
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Court's approval of the amount allocated to conscious suffering by the 
executrix, pointing out the impossibility of determining damages on 
this ground with any precision. The case was sent back for a correct 
determination of funeral and hospital expenses, which were improp-
erly computed in the account. An issue, raised by the executrix, that 
the town was not a "party aggrieved" under G.L., c. 215, §9, was de-
cided in favor of the town. The Court pointed out that the decree 
allowing the account clearly affected the town's right to reimburse-
ment, and it had a direct financial interest in the correctness of the 
determination of the amounts in the account. 
Acts of 1962, c. 653, amends G.L., c. ll8A, §l, to increase the trans-
portation allowance of aid recipients from four to five dollars. 
§18.24. Hospital care for needy individuals: Support by municipal-
ity. Acts of 1959, c. 584, added a new Section 24A to G.L., c. 117, that 
provides in effect that the municipality of residence is responsible for 
hospital expenses of a person in need of public assistance. Interpre-
tation of this provision was the crux of two cases with the same name, 
Massachusetts General Hospital v. City of Chelsea,1 both decided 
during the 1962 SURVEY year. In these two cases the hospital sought 
recovery for hospitalization expenses of residents of the city. The 
defense was that neither resident was a needy person under the in-
tendment of the statute, and the Boston Municipal Court so held in 
both cases. The evidence clearly showed that each of the two persons 
had transferred property of considerable value to others shortly before 
he was admitted to the hospital. The Supreme Judicial Court found 
the cases controlled by Symmes Arlington Hospital, Inc. v. Arlington,2 
which interpreted similar provisions in G.L., c. 117, §24. The city 
or town is immediately liable for expenses of a person seriously ill or 
badly injured, since the hospital is entitled to act upon appearances 
and the claims of the patient. But the patient need not be held to 
be in distress and in need of immediate relief during the entire hos-
pital stay. The plaintiff hospital had to prove that the need contin-
ued before it could recover for the full time of the hospital stay, and 
it did not meet its burden in these two cases. The cases were returned 
with directions to find that the hospital was entitled to recovery for 
at least one day and such further time as the judge concludes was en-
compassed within the emergency under which the hospital acted. 
§18.25. Aid to the blind. Acts of 1962, cc. 503 and 505, both 
amended G.L., c. 69, §23, which concerns in part the determination 
of need in aiding blind persons. The first act raised the income ex-
emption of $50 to a direction that the first $85 of earned income and 
one half of all earned income over $85 is to be disregarded by the 
director in determining need in furnishing aid to the blind. The 
second act changed the maximum allowable funeral expense reim-
bursement from $200 to $350. Acts of 1962, c. 611, amended Acts of 
§18.24. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 18~ N.E.2d 100, and 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 909, 
18~ N.E.2d 102. 
2292 Mass. 162, 197 N .E. 677 (19~5). 
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1957, c. 669, to change the rate of retirement payment for certain blind 
persons who had been employed in a workshop for the blind. 
§18.26. Assistance to disabled persons: Parent's duty of support~ 
In Fenton v. Department of Public Welfare,l the department sought 
to include the parent's assets and income in its determination of a 
disabled child's need for financial assistance. The department rule 
has been adopted to carry out the policy of C.L., c. 118D, §8, which 
provides that certain parents are obligated to support their disabled 
children. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the statutory pro-
vision gave the city or town the right to obtain reimbursement from 
a parent but does not give a disabled child this right. Thus, in the 
present case, in which a father refused to give information on his re-
sources and income to the local board, the disabled child could not 
force him to do so, nor could she require him to support her. The 
Court noted that the basic policy of this and similar statutes is to 
provide assistance as promptly as possible. The department's adminis-
trative ruling resulted necessarily in delays and uncertainties. 
§18.27. Aid to dependent children. The basic provisions of the aid 
to dependent children financial assistance program were modified 
during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 556, amended C.L., c. 
118, §2, to remove the requirement that the parent must be deter-
mined to be fit to bring up the child before aid can be granted. Section 
3 of C.L., c. 118, was also amended by the act to again remove the 
requirement of parental fitness. The board of public welfare had in 
the past the duty of securing all necessary aid from relatives, organi-
zations and individuals; the new act limits this duty to relatives and 
organizations only. The policy that aid shall be granted as promptly 
as possible is effectuated by a removal from the standards of a deter-
mination that aid cannot be obtained from other sources. The pri-
mary obligation to furnish aid thus rests upon the board itself, not 
outside sources. 
Acts of 1962, c. 535, makes certain by specific statement that the 
duty of the Department of Public Welfare to provide foster care for 
children includes "financial responsibility." It amends C.L., c. 119, 
§23. 
§18.28. Financial aid to needy dependents of persons on active 
service in the armed forces. Acts of 1962, c. 759, sets up a program to 
provide aid when necessary to dependents of armed forces personnel. 
The program affects only a limited number of persons but was con-
sidered necessary because of the calling up of a number of Massachu-
setts national guard and reserve personnel to active duty. 
G. HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELFARE 
§18.29. Common Day of Rest Law. A complete rewriting of C.L., 
c. 136, was accomplished by Acts of 1962, c. 616. The title of the 
chapter was changed from "Observance of the Lord's Day" to "Ob-
§18.26. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785,182 N.E.2d 528. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1962 [1962], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1962/iss1/21
244 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.30 
servance of a Common Day of Rest and Legal Holidays," indicating 
the shift of emphasis in the purpose of the statute that was indicated 
by the United States Supreme Court to be the acceptable basis for 
this type of statute in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of 
Massachusetts.1 The statute represents more of a rewriting of the older 
law than any major change in concept or application. The difficulty 
in developing a satisfactory substitute for the prior, admittedly anti-
quated chapter was obvious from the report of the Sutherland Com-
mission and the exchanges between the Governor and the President 
of the Senate. The new chapter can be said to represent some im-
provement in form and theory, but does not contain the radical revi-
sions and excisions many persons would prefer. The act contains the 
clause that the invalidation of anyone section as unconstitutional shall 
not affect the remaining sections. This clause, only occasionally used 
in Massachusetts legislation, reflects the present uncertainty of this type 
of law's being always held to be constitutional. The grafting of the 
numerous exceptions to the application of the general prohibition of 
activity, in Section 5 of the new chapter, onto the statute raises serious 
problems of classification under equal protection, even assuming that 
the religious historical background of the legislation will continue to 
be treated as constitutionally non-crucial. 
§18.30. Health and safety legislation. A number of new laws 
affecting health and safety were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year, 
although few of them were of any general importance. Acts of 1962, 
c. 350, requires the Director of Civil Defense to set up standards for 
fallout shelters. Any shelter for a family unit, built in accordance with 
the prescribed standards and used exclusively for fallout shelter pur-
poses, is declared to be an accessory use under zoning laws and can be 
built at any location on the property without violating local zoning 
regulations. The prescribed standards will also prevail over building 
code standards, although the administrative provisions of the local 
building code must still be complied with. 
Fluoridation of water supplies remains an emotional as well as medi-
cal issue in the state. General Laws, c. 40, §41B, has provided that the 
question of adoption of fluoridation is to be put upon the ballot by 
the board of water commissioners or their local equivalent. Acts of 
1962, c. 485, provides that a petition of 5 percent of a municipality'S 
registered voters will henceforth be required before the question of 
whether to adopt fluoridation is put upon the ballot. This amendment 
to G.L., c. 40, §41B, is supplemented by a new Section 41C, providing 
that the question of defluoridation be put upon the ballot if 5 percent 
of the unit's registered voters so request. On balance, this change in 
the statute seems to help those opposed to fluoridation for, unless con-
siderable interest is generated, the question is now not too likely to 
get put upon the ballot. 
Resolves of 1962, c. 101, provides for a study by the Judicial Council 
§18.29. 1366 U.S. 617, 81 Sup. Ct. 1122. 6 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1961), noted in con-
siderable detail in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.3, 13.4, 18.9. 
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of the problems of indemnifying state and municipal employees for 
any liabilities they incur under actions arising out of their use of 
sources of ionizing radiation. 
The fire hazards of space heaters are obvious to all who read the 
newspapers. Regulation of these units has been improved under Acts 
of 1962, c. 688. General Laws, c. 148, has a new Section 25A forbidding 
the sale of secondhand space heaters or installation of any such heaters 
in buildings in which persons reside. A new Section 25B prohibits, 
effective July 1, 1965, the use of these space heaters in any building 
used in whole or in part for human habitation. 
Acts of 1962, c. 632, provides for voluntary admission of alcoholics 
and drug addicts to certain state hospitals and institutions. Rates in 
county hospitals are regulated by Acts of 1962, c. 760. 
Resolves of 1962, c. 138, created a special commission to study 
nursing homes. The major and growing importance of these institu-
tions, and in some cases their shabby reputation, makes this full study 
advisable. 
H. CIVIL SERVICE 
§18.31. Power to regrade examination. In Ferguson v. Civil Serv-
ice Commission l the plaintiff and another had taken an examination 
for promotion in the Quincy police department. The other person 
examined requested the director to remark one of his answers and, on 
being refused, sought and obtained the remarking from the defendant 
commission. The plaintiff, because of the remarking, was placed be-
low the other person on the promotion list. The present action was 
a writ of certiorari that sought to have the commission's remarking 
action quashed, basically upon the contention that the other candidate's 
answer was wrong as a matter of law. The Court found that the credit 
to be given to the answer was "a matter within the commission's sound 
and honest discretion, in the light of all relevant factors, including its 
experience in giving similar examinations to persons of comparable 
training and qualifications." The grading was not arbitrary or devoid 
of logic or reason, and thus the commission's action in remarking the 
question was not to be disturbed by the courts. The further issue of 
whether certiorari was the proper means of seeking review of the com-
mission's action was not, as it did not need to be, decided. The issue 
is, however, an interesting and very close one. 
§18.32. Civil service legislation. The appeals to the Civil Service 
Commission from action of the director have in the past been heard 
under G.L., c. 31, §2(b), before less than a majority of the commission. 
Acts of 1962, c. 270, created a change in this rule, requiring a majority 
of the commission to act when the appeal involves the marking of 
examination papers, unless the appeal concerns ineligibility for failure 
to meet entrance requirements. All other appeals may still be heard 
by less than a majority. 
§18.:n. 1 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 949, 182 N.E.2d 826. 
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The provisions concerning appointments and transfer of civil serv-
ice personnel were twice amended during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts 
of 1962, c. 743, requires that the director shall not authorize a provi-
sional appointment until the duties of the position are set out on a 
detailed form. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 236, further amends G.L., c. 31, §15, 
and forbids a provisional appointment or temporary transfer as long 
as any name remains on the examination eligibility list for the position, 
except upon good cause. Acts of 1962, c. 743, also gives the Director 
of Civil Service certain discretionary powers relative to time limits 
imposed upon provisional appointments and temporary transfers. 
Acts of 1962, c. 510, amends G.L., c. 31, §15D, regulating determi-
nation of seniority, by setting up a distinct and new rule for transfers, 
while retaining the old rule for appointments and promotions. 
Acts of 1962, c. 205, amends G.L., c. 31, §43(b), relating to hearings 
upon discharges, removals, transfers, or reductions in rank of civil 
service employees who have tenure. The time provisions, requiring 
the hearing to be completed in thirty days, were amended so that a 
continuance as deemed necessary or advisable can be authorized by 
the hearing officer at his discretion. Acts of 1962, c. 690, relates to 
appeals from classification by state employees, under G.L., c. 30, §49. 
The new act provides for an appeal from a division decision to the 
personnel appeals board set up under G.L., c. 30, §54. 
I. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION 
§18.33. Municipal employee: Rate of pay when holding two posi-
tions. In Amelotte v. City of Worcester1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
had to determine if an employee, regularly employed in two full-time 
jobs, as a nurse·anesthetist and a nurse-supervisor, was entitled to step 
rate increases based upon service in the earlier held job for the second 
job, and if he was entitled to the overtime rate of pay for the second 
job. The contention concerning step rate increases was determined 
against the employee upon the basis of the applicable city ordinance 
defining pay scales for various classifications of employment. The 
plaintiff's claim for overtime pay for the second job was based upon 
G.L., c. 149, §33B, which had been accepted by the city. The section 
provides that overtime rates of pay are to be paid to employees who per-
form excess service as authorized by a city official, describing the excess 
service as "such additional service." The Court read this section nar-
rowly, limiting the additional service to that authorized by the person 
under whom the employee works. The employee here had simply suc-
ceeded in obtaining two jobs from the city. The second job was not 
additional service authorized by the plaintiff's senior. 
§18.34. Municipal employee: Raise in salary. In Councillors of 
Brockton v. Gildea,! the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a Superior 
§18.32. 1 Amending C.L., c. 31, §15. 
§18.33. 1343 Mass. 155, 177 N.E.2d 775 (1961). 
§18.34. 1343 Mass. 631, 180 N.E.2d 77 (1962). 
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Court determination that an attempted raise in a city manager's salary 
was not effective. The Superior Court had properly held that a salary 
increase for the city manager could only be made by a city ordinance 
adopted by a two-thirds vote, and that the budget appropriation, 
passed by a two-thirds vote, was not the legal equivalent of a city ordi-
nance. General Laws, c. 44, §33A, provides that the budget shall in-
clude sums sufficient to pay salaries as fixed by law or ordinance. No 
ordinance had been passed in this case raising the manager's salary, 
and he was thus limited to the $10,000 salary set by a prior ordinance, 
not the $13,000 authorized in the budget. 
§18.35. Police officers and firefighters. Several amendments to the 
statutes regulating the compensation of police officers and firefighters 
were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 520, added 
a new Section 108F to G.L., c. 41, and set new minimum salaries for 
firemen in those cities or towns that accept the provisions of the sec-
tion. Acts of 1962, c. 517, adding new Section 57D to G.L., c. 41, and 
Acts of 1962, c. 318, amending Section 17A of G.L., c. 147, provide that 
firefighters and police officers, respectively, shall receive either an addi-
tional day off or an additional day's compensation if they work on 
prescribed holidays. Acts of 1962, c. 321, provides that a police officer 
whose employment is terminated without fault shall be compensated 
for any special pay he may have been entitled to under various provi-
sions of the law governing overtime pay and additional days Off.l The 
law governing indemnification of police officers and firefighters, G.L., 
c. 41, §100, was rewritten by Acts of 1962, c. 580. The provisions of 
the section are now more detailed, specifically providing for the in-
demnification of hospital, medical, surgical, nursing, pharmaceutical, 
prosthetic and related expenses incurred because of accident or hazard 
while performing assigned duties. A procedure for appeals from ad-
verse decision is also set out. 
§18.36. Other compensation statutes. Acts of 1962, c. 514, provides 
for certain fees to be paid to those requested by a district attorney to 
aid in the investigation of a crime.1 General Laws, c. 31, §47E, was 
amended by Acts of 1962, c. 579, setting out new provisions concerning 
compensation for municipal public welfare employees. Overtime is 
not to be paid to employees of the Commonwealth who are on a travel 
status, under the amendment to G.L., c. 149, §30B, adopted by Acts 
of 1962, c. 748. 
J. RETIREMENT, PENSIONS AND INSURANCE 
§18.37. Contributory retirement: Removal of "official." In Welch 
v. Contributory Retiremen.t Appeal Board 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court had to determine if an employee's removal was governed by the 
§18.35. 1 The act refers to G.L., c. 41, §llIH, and G.L., c. 147, §§17A-17C, and 
amends G.L., c. 147, §§17E, lllI. 
§18.36. 1 Amending G.L., c. 262, §29. 
§18.37. 1343 Mass. 502, 180 N.E.2d 326 (1962). 
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Contributory Retirement Law or by the Plan E charter of the city of 
Medford. General Laws, c. 32, §16(2), governing'removals of certain 
employees under the contributory retirement system, requires notice 
and a statement of reasons for removal, with provisions for hearings 
and a final board determination that the removal was justified. The 
Court held this provision was superseded in the Welch case by G.L., 
c. 43, §§104 and 105, giving the city manager the right of removal. 
The Court's decision was based primarily upon Williams v. City Man-
ager of Haverhill,2 and it reconsidered and affirmed its more recent 
holding in Regan v. Commissioner of Insurance.3 The Contributory 
Retirement Law, being a general act, was superseded by the special 
act, the Plan E charter law, upon the same subject. 
§18.38. Contributory retirement: Liability under mutual aid plan. 
The cities of Everett and Revere, along with Chelsea, some years ago 
entered into a mutual aid plan which provided that each should 
supply certain firefighting services to the other in accordance with pre-
arranged plans. In City of Everett v. City of Revere} the plaintiff city 
sought reimbursement for accidental disability pension payments, paid 
to a member of its fire department who suffered a heart attack while 
carrying out his prearranged duties at a fire in the defendant city. 
The lower court had agreed with the plaintiff city's contention that 
G.L., c. 32, §7(4)(a) and (b) controlled, which section imposes a man-
datory reimbursement requirement on the aided governmental unit 
when an employee of the aiding municipality is injured in carrying 
out his duties. The statute is general in application and refers to all 
types of aid. 
The defendant city's contention, upheld by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, was that G.L., c. 48, §59A, controlled. Section 59A governs aid 
by one governmental unit to another in case of fire, and its provisions 
make reimbursement for injuries and death permissive, not compul-
sory, upon the aided city. The apparent inconsistency between the 
two statutes' reimbursement provisions was settled by preferring the 
specific act governing firefighting aid over the general act governing 
aid of all types. To hold to the contrary would have rendered the 
specific legislation nugatory, which the Court thought unreasonable, 
particularly since that statute had been amended as late as 1960. 
§18.39. Contributory retirement: Death benefits and cause of 
death. Two 1962 SURVEY year cases involved the question of whether 
death benefits were payable to survivors. These benefits are payable 
under G.L., c. 32, §9(1), only when death was a natural and proximate 
result of personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result 
of and while in performance of the decedent's duties at some definite 
time and place. In Cataldo v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board,1 
2 !I!IO Mass. 14, llO N.E.2d 851 (195!1). 
S!l4!1 Mass. 202,178 N.E.2d 81 (1961). 
§18.!l8. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1077, 18!1 N.E.2d 716. 
§18.!l9. 1 !l4!1 Mass. !l12. 178 N.E.2d 480 (1961), also noted in §12.2 supra. 
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the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the board's determination that 
an employee's death as a result of a heart attack suffered while working 
as a power plant engineer was not a result of physical injury or occu-
pational hazard. The claimant did not sustain her burden of proof. 
The same result was reached in Mullen v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Board,2 in which the Court also sustained the board's finding 
that the heart attack of which the decedent died was not a result of 
personal injury sustained in the performance of his duties. The mere 
fact alone that a heart attack occurred while the decedent fire chief 
was preparing to answer a call did not require the conclusion that the 
heart attack was caused by physical exertion or emotional excitement. 
§18.40. Contributory retirement: Federal income taxes. In 
Corkum v. United States1 the taxpayer sought a refund on federal 
income taxes paid by him on a disability allowance payable to him un-
der the contributory retirement law. The taxpayer claimed that the 
amount received was non-taxable as income received while absent from 
work on account of sickness, under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §I05(d). 
The Court rejected this argument, determining that the taxpayer had 
under the contributory retirement law, G.L., c. 32, §5, reached retire-
ment age. Therefore, the federal tax law, as interpreted by the Treas-
ury Regulations, removed the taxpayer from the group entitled to the 
sick pay exclusion. 
§18.41. Contributory retirement: Statutory changes. Acts of 1962, 
c. 548, amended G.L., c. 32, §3(5), to include among those who may 
take advantage of the credit system for prior uncovered service, a 
person who had been in a temporary, provisional or substitute posi-
tion, ineligible for membership in the system. Section 4 of G.L., c. 32, 
was amended by Acts of 1962, c. 584, which added a new paragraph 
governing qualifications for creditable service, to include a group of 
persons who received certain disability payments prior to 1951 under 
G.L., c. 152, and who returned to their former employment upon 
termination of their disability. 
Acts of 1962, c. 516, allows an additional retirement allowance of 
fifteen dollars for each year of creditable service to those who qualify 
as veterans. The amendment to G.L., c. 32, §10(2)(a), is retroactive. 
Acts of 1962, c. 606, provides an alternative method of computation 
of veterans' allowance under the retirement law in place of the amount 
determined by G.L., c. 32, §12.1 An allowance to certain widows is 
also provided under Acts of 1962, c. 506, in cases in which a survivor-
ship option was not originally elected. Acts of 1962, c. 646, increased 
benefits payable to former employees accidentally disabled. 
Two amendments to G.L., c. 32, §16, were adopted during the 1962 
SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 114, requires that a veteran need only 
ten years of creditable service prior to his entitlement to notice and 
2343 Mass. 641,180 N.E.2d 452 (1962). 
§18.40. 1204 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1962). 
§18.41. 1 The act amends Acts of 1961, c. 490. 
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hearing upon removal or discharge. Non-veterans must still have 
fifteen or twenty years of service, depending upon their age, prior to 
having a right to a hearing. This same specific veteran service require-
ment is inserted by the act into the section concerning review of a 
removal or dismissal by the District Court. Acts of 1962, c. 391, 
amended Section 16 to require the Contributory Retirement Appeal 
Board to pass upon an appeal to it within six months after a hearing. 
This six-month limitation is designed to speed board decisions. 
Acts of 1962, c. 682, amended G.L., c. 32, §25, to permit a govern-
ment unit who has accepted or does accept the special provisions 
governing veterans of the Spanish and World Wars to apply the 
Section 25 veterans' benefits to those qualified. Prior to this act, the 
Section 25 provisions only applied if the Spanish and World War 
veterans' provisions were adopted prior to 1946. 
A new Section 94A was added to G.L., c. 32, by Acts of 1962, c. 164, 
which provides a conclusive presumption that impairment of health 
caused by diseases of the lungs or respiratory tract in the case of fire-
fighters who had successfully passed a physical exam upon entry into 
this service was suffered in the line of duty. This presumption is 
similar to that involving firefighters and policemen as to hypertension 
or heart disease under G.L., c. 32, §94. The two sections apply to 
retirements under the accidental disability retirement law. 
§18.42. Group insurance. The rather special issue of whether a 
municipal light commission was a "district" entitled to accept the 
group insurance law was involved in Municipal Light Commission of 
Taunton v. State Employees' Group Insurance Commissioner.l Gen-
eral Laws, c. 32B, §2, includes districts, as therein defined, as an appro-
priate unit to accept the insurance law. The plaintiff municipal light 
commission was held by the Court not to be a district but a depart-
ment of the city, since it did not meet the definition of "other ... 
public unit created within one or more political subdivisions of the 
commonwealth for the purpose of providing public services or conven-
iences. . .." There is a strong policy in the group insurance statute 
to gather employees in large groups. 
Acts of 1962, c. 647, amends G.L., cc. 32A and 32B, to provide for 
contributory group hospital, surgical and medical insurance to elderly 
persons retired from service in the Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions. The State Employees' Group Insurance Commission is 
empowered to purchase general and blanket insurance to provide this 
coverage, by the insertion of new Section lOB in G.L., c. 32A, this new 
section also prescribing the administrative details. General Laws, 
c. 32B, is amended by inserting a new Section lIB that governs accept-
ance of the plan by political subdivisions of the state. Section 10 of 
G.L., c. 32B, is further amended to exclude this new provision from 
the general acceptance provisions which require acceptance by the 
registered voters of a general group insurance plan for a political sub-
division. This section was also amended by Acts of 1962, c. 150, which 
§18.42. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1017, 1811 N.E.2d 286. 
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made clear that general acceptance of the plan did not include accept-
ance by the subdivision of a contribution by the subdivision of a part 
of the premium to retired employees and the additional insurance 
permitted by Section llA of G.L., c. 32B. Section llA was also itself 
amended during the 1962 SURVEY year. The optional amounts per-
missible in each wage category became a prescribed instead of a maxi-
mum amount, and the requirement of a 75 percent participation before 
the additional insurance can be carried by a political subdivision was 
repealed. 
K. DISMISSAL AND REMOVAL 
§18.43. Involuntary separation: Powers of Commissioner of Insur-
ance. In two cases decided during the 1962 SURVEY year, the power of 
the Commissioner of Insurance to separate certain employees from 
their positions was upheld. Cieri v. Commissioner of Insurance l was 
a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to 
restore the petitioner to his position as a member of the board of 
appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds. The petitioner's 
original appointment was made effective "during the period of time 
this designation remains unrevoked." As a veteran with over three 
years' service, he claimed that the procedures of the Veterans' Tenure 
Act (G.L., c. 30, §9A) controlled the procedure for his separation and, 
as it was not followed, he was improperly removed. The Court 
rejected this contention. The petitioner was a representative of the 
appointing commissioner, his tenure ceased with the termination of 
the commissioner's tenure and this period was less than the three-year 
period required for veterans' tenure. Service after the date of the 
new commissioner's appointment was merely a holding over for public 
convenience. 
The Court went further, however, and held that the type of position 
the petitioner occupied was not within the coverage of the Veterans' 
Tenure Act. The position was one of the main responsibilities of the 
commissioner, and the appointment of a representative to sit in his 
place is strictly a personal prerogative. The fact that G.L., c. 30, §9A, 
lists certain exclusions from the Veterans' Tenure Act does not mean 
those exclusions are the only permissible ones. The functions of this 
particular position are so primarily the responsibility of the commis-
sioner, under G.L., c. 26, §8A, that tenure in the office would be un-
acceptable and could not be presumed. 
In Regan v. Commission.er of Insurance2 the petitioner sought res-
toration to the office of assistant chief examiner of the department. 
He had been appointed in 1949 and served until suspended in 1954. 
Later in 1954 the commissoner submitted another person for the post 
and this appointment was approved by the Governor and Council. 
The commissioner is given, by G.L., c. 26, §7, the power to appoint 
§18.4!1. 1343 Mass. 181, 178 N.E.2d 77 (1961), also noted in §16.5 supra. 
2343 Mass. 202, 178 N.E.2d 81 (1961). 
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and remove various officials, including those in the post held by the 
petitioner, with the approval of the Governor and Council. The 
Court construed this provision according to its terms to mean that 
no cause need be given by the commissioner. The petitioner was thus 
held not entitled to the rights given under G.L., c. 32, §16(2), govern-
ing removal and discharge of those in the status of civil service em-
ployees. 
§18.44. Termination of employment: Retroactive effect of statute. 
In Welch v. Mayor of Taunton l the plaintiff sought a declaration that 
he had been improperly removed by the defendant upon charges of 
malfeasance in office. The statute giving the mayor the power of re-
moval was enacted in 1960 as an amendment to G.L., c. 164, §56E.2 
The plaintiff had been appointed to" the position of member of the 
municipal light commission prior to the date of the enactment of this 
statute and, more crucial, the claimed malfeasance had also occurred 
prior to this date. The Court determined that the statutory power 
of removal merely went to remedy and thus could be construed retro-
actively to cover situations that occurred prior to its adoption. The 
remedial nature of the statute, as it fills a gap in the statutory scheme, 
indicates a legislative intent not to limit the statute to prospective 
actions. No private right was adversely affected since, although the 
plaintiff may suffer additional consequences because of his wrong-
doing, he has no right, after having done wrong in office, to have the 
laws governing dismissal remain unchanged. 
L. EDUCATION 
§18.45. Higher education. The University of Massachusetts has 
in the past been unusual although not unique among state universiti.es 
in not being largely self-governing. Acts of 1962, c. 648, has given the 
university this power of self-government. New Sections I through 15 
of G.L., c. 75, give the trustees adequate power to administer the uni-
versity, with authority to delegate certain of these powers to the presi-
dent and other university officials. Budgetary, financial and auditing 
control remain basically in the state government. This statute, if not 
perhaps ideal, represents a great step forward in the development of 
the state university, giving it an administrative and policy-making 
flexibility that should facilitate further advances over those already 
great ones the institution has taken in recent years. Acts of 1962, c. 
786, further combined the development program of the university by 
the authorization of a medical school. The same act increased the 
number of university trustees to seventeen, none of whom can be affili-
ated in any capacity with a private medical school. This membership 
limitation is unfortunate, since it would seem to be rather difficult to 
find persons who know more of medical education than medical edu-
§18.44. 1 S4S Mal!8. 485, 179 N.E.2d 890 (1962). 
2 Acts of 1960, c. MS. 
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cators. Presumptively, however, their advice would be obtainable on 
a consultive basis. 
Chapter 553 of the Acts of 1962 details additional powers to the 
state Board of Education over the state colleges and the appointment 
of personnel to their staffs. Acts of 1962, c. 559, authorizes summer 
sessions at state colleges on a no-expense-to-Commonwealth basis. 
Budgetary problems of state educational institutions have always 
been difficult ones. To help solve this problem, an Advisory Board 
of Higher Education Policy was created, with the duty to report to the 
Governor or General Court each year as to their recommendations on 
the division of funds among state institutions of higher learning.1 
§18.46. Secondary and primary education: Teachers. The Su-
preme Judicial Court decided two relatively minor cases concerning 
teachers' rights during the 1962 SURVEY year. In O'Day v. School Com-
mittee of West Brookfield} the Court reiterated its earlier holding in 
Duncan v. School Committee of Springfield 2 that the statutory review 
of dismissal, set out in G.L., c. 32, §16, must be complied with by a 
dismissed teacher before review of such action by mandamus can be 
sought. The teacher in the present case, by failing to bring her peti-
tion for review within the required thirty-day period, had not ex-
hausted her statutory remedies. 
The plaintiff in Dimlich v. School Committee of Andovef41 was 
principal of a junior high school for the academic year 1949-1950 and 
was again appointed principal for the three-year period, 1957-1960. In 
1960 he was not reappointed and was retained as assistant principal 
and teacher at some reduction of salary. General Laws, c. 71, §42A, 
provides tenure to principals and supervisors who have more than 
three years' duty in their positions. The Court reversed the Superior 
Court determination that the plaintiff had tenure, holding that, de-
spite differing facts, Kelley v. School Committee of Watertown4 re-
quired that the "for over three years" statutory requirement referred 
to consecutive, not interrupted, service. 
Under the provision of G.L., c. 71, §43, it had been held, in McCartin 
v. School Committee of Lowell,1i that reduction in salary of a principal 
upon demotion was forbidden. The plaintiff in the Dimlich case 
argued that the McCartin case required a restitution of the salary re-
duction he had suffered upon demotion to assistant principal. The 
Court disagreed, finding that the adoption after the McCartin case of 
G.L., c. 71, §42A, changed the statutory scheme as to principals, and 
a principal without tenure under Section 42A was not protected by 
the salary reduction provisions of Section 43. 
While these two cases settled points of law of interest to some 
§18.45. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 429. 
§18.46. 1343 Mass. 122, 177 N.E.2d 569 (1961). 
2331 Mass. 738, 122 N.E.2d 630 (1954). 
s 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145,184 N.E.2d 40. 
4330 Mass. 150, 111 N.E.2d 749 (1953). 
Ii 322 Mass. 624, 628, 79 N .E.2d 192, 194-195 (1948). 
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teachers, the enactment by Acts of 1962, c. 594, of a new minimum 
salary was of importance to a considerably greater number. The 
minimum was raised, except for those in training and temporary sub-
stitutes, from $4000 to $4500. Ideally, the setting of salary scales for 
teachers should be done locally, but a state-set minimum maintained 
at some reason abe relation to that required to attain moderately well-
qualified teachers is certainly acceptable. The state, too, has a direct 
interest, even above the financial, in the education of its citizens, and 
a minimum teacher's salary at least is one means by which the state's 
interest and policy can be effectuated. Acts of 1962, c. 519, removes 
the local option aspect of this minimum salary provision, which prior 
to this act only applied to those employing units that had accepted it. 
This amendment to G.L., c. 71, §40, adopted over gubernatorial veto, 
will aid in the effectuation of state policy of encouraging adequate 
educational standards. 
Acts of 1962, c. 175, permits a teacher to authorize a payroll deduc-
tion for payment of dues to an association of teachers. Deductions 
are payable by the local treasurer to associations whose treasurers have 
given a bond for the faithful performance of their duties in an amount 
satisfactory to the local treasurer. This act does not take effect until 
accepted by a city, town or school district. 
§18.47. Secondary and primary education: Local boards. No vi-
tally important legislation concerning school board duties was enacted 
during the 1962 SURVEY year. The minimum salary provisions dis-
cussed above l will require action by a few local boards. Acts of 1962, 
c. 11, increased the number of days during which public elementary 
schools must be maintained open from 160 to 180 days.2 Acts of 1962, 
c. 410, related to the financial penalties on towns that fail to submit 
educational reports. It amended G.L., c. 72, §6, to omit a specific 
penalty of $200 in cases in which a town is not entitled to distributions 
from the state school fund. Since few, if any, towns would not receive 
school fund grants, the effect of this amendment is minimal. Acts of 
1962, c. 555, adds a new Section 46J to G.L., c. 71, to permit school 
units and districts to join together in providing the educational facili-
ties for emotionally disturbed children authorized in Section 46H of 
the chapter. 
General Laws, c. 71, §7A, provides for the awarding of school bus 
contracts. Acts of 1962, c. 729, extensively amended this section to 
require assurance of adequate salary scales for the drivers of these 
buses. The Commissioner of Labor and Industries will furnish to the 
school committee of each city or town of at least sixteen thousand 
population a schedule of rates of wages determined by the rate paid 
under collective bargaining agreements in the municipality to oper-
ators of motor buses. This schedule is to be incorporated into the 
bid and into any contract awarded, and violation of the wage rate 
scale is criminally punishable. 
§I8.47. 1 See discussion in §18.46 supra. 
2 Amending G.L., c. 71, §l. 
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§18.48. Day care. General Laws, c. Ill, §§58-62, governing the li-
censing of day care services for children, was extensively revised by 
Acts of 1962, c. 719. Prior to the new act, licensing was in the hands 
of local boards of health. Under the new provisions, the state De-
partment of Health becomes the primary licensing agency, with the 
proviso that it may delegate this function to a consenting local board 
of health that meets department standards. Department standards 
are to be the minimum, and any local board may set higher require-
ments. The sanctions for maintaining an unlicensed school have been 
drastically increased, and now include the possibility of a six months' 
imprisonment. The new law contains a number of details that differ 
from prior legislation, and must be consulted by anyone planning on 
any type of day care or educational institution for children under 
regular school age.1 
Acts of 1962, c. 720, continues the new pattern of state regulation 
of health and safety standards of day care institutions. This new 
statute modifies Chapter 15 of the General Laws so that day care insti-
tutions must meet building safety requirements. A certificate of such 
compliance is required before the institution can be licensed under 
new G.L., c. 111, §59. 
§18,49. Improvements in education. Acts of 1962, c. 585, sets up in 
the Department of Education an Advisory Commission on Academi-
cally Talented Pupils, designed to provide recommendations for the 
improvement of the education of academically talented students. The 
goal is a worthy one but points out the present retreat from the edu-
cational theory that students should each, as independent persons and 
not as members of a special group, be trained to make maximum use 
of their abilities in a social setting. Once students are categorized as 
a member of one or another group, a stratification occurs that may 
not be fully desirable in our educational system. 
More importantly, or at least hopefully so, Resolves of 1962, cc. 108 
and 145, create an unpaid special commission to restudy the educa-
tional system of the Commonwealth. The program of the commis-
sion is too big for ready solution but should at least make po sible a 
good beginning toward rethinking the major elements of the state's 
educational program. A broad consideration of the entire educational 
philosophy of the state is in order, and not because of any drastic de-
ficiencies but because certain aspects of the programs tend, if not to 
conflict, at least not to coordinate with each other. 
M. HIGHWAYS AND MOTOR VEHICLES 
§18.50. Highway construction. One of the major difficulties oc-
curring in highway and other large government construction projects 
has been the possibility of the successful bidder not being equipped to 
carry out construction of the entire project. To alleviate this possi-
§18.48. 1 See Hardy, Municipal Law §435 (1959), for the previous practice. 
I 
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bility, Acts of 1962, c. 748, adds a new Section 8B to G.L., c. 29.1 
Under this new law, a bidder must set forth his qualifications to per-
form the work. The information, maintained confidentially, is to be 
used to determine if a bidder is qualified to perform specific work 
under bid proposals. The act sets up a number of limitations upon 
the Commissioner of Public Works' power and provides a grievance 
procedure. 
Traffic control agreements between federal and state governments 
are an important aspect of the federally aided state highway programs. 
In addition the state Department of Public Works has set up official 
standards for traffic control. Acts of 1962, c. 603, requires that cities 
and towns comply with these two types of standards, and failure to 
do so will result in the withholding or withdrawal of highway funds 
from the offending city or town.2 
General Laws, c. 44, §§6 and 6A, permit a city or town to borrow 
funds in anticipation of reimbursement by a county or the Common-
wealth for land damages and highway construction. Notes on these 
borrowings have been limited to a one-year term, but Acts of 1962, 
c. 607, permits two-year terms.8 
Acts of 1962, c. 610, amends G.L., c. 81, §7E, so that excess lands not 
needed in connection with a limited access highway may be sold by 
the Department of Public Works although the land sold was not paid 
for by the department. This gives the department some additional 
flexibility in its disposal of excess lands, although a more extensive 
program of such disposal is needed in the Commonwealth. Acts of 
1962, c. 587, adds a new Section 7I to G.L., c. 81, and provides for 
agreements between a railroad and the department when relocation 
or alteration of railroad facilities is required in connection with high-
way construction. It authorizes the department to advance Common-
wealth funds to railroads to cover work in progress for which the state 
has partial financial responsibility. 
In planning for highways and city and town ways it is often desira-
ble that the planners be permitted to go onto privately owned land 
for surveys, inspections and soundings. Acts of 1962, c. 589, adds a 
new Section IIA to G.L., c. 82, permitting county commissioners to 
go upon private land, after adequate notice. The entry upon the land 
does not constitute a trespass or an entry under eminent domain, but 
the section provides for reimbursement of the owner for any damages 
he may suffer from the entry. 
Acts of 1962, c. 228, remedied the defect in the 1961 legislation· 
that permitted excess gross weights of certain motor vehicles. The 
new limitation conforms to federal requirements and insures that the 
§IS.50. 1 The act also applies to municipalities on contracts covered by G.L., 
c. 90, §!!4. 
2 Amending G.L., c. SI, §26, and c. 90, §!\4(a)(2). 
8 The act also amends G.L., c. 44, §17, governing the procedure for making tem-
porary loans. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 52!!. 
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Commonwealth can, on this issue, continue to receive federal highway 
grants in aid. 
§18.51. Motor vehicles: Taxes. The difficulties that had arisen be-
cause all automobiles had been assessed for tax as if they had auto-
matic transmissions prompted the enactment of two statutes during 
the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 230, extended the time for 
applications for abatements for these taxes. Acts of 1962, c. 231, re-
quires that applications for registration of motor vehicles henceforth 
include information on the type of transmission of the car being regis-
tered. This same information is then, under the act, forwarded to the 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation. 
§18.52. Motor vehicles: Traffic offenses. The concept of a "no-fix" 
traffic law was in part adopted under Acts of 1962, c. 789, which cre-
ated a new Chapter 90C of the General Laws. The main objection 
that has been raised to this legislation is that it permits a senior police 
officer to determine what disposition is to be made of the citation 
given by the arresting or citing officer. The law as enacted should 
partially remedy the problem of ticket fixing, but cannot do so com-
pletely as long as discretion exists, in other than a court, to determine 
action to be taken once the ticket has been issued. 
Acts of 1962, c. 786, gives greater powers to the cities of Boston and 
Cambridge to fix fines for minor traffic offenses. It amends G.L., c. 90, 
by adding new Sections 20C and 20D and removing those cities from 
the general provisions of Section 20A, governing non-criminal dis-
position of parking violations. . 
A number of states have, for safety reasons, adopted various types 
of legislation that recognize the commission of traffic offenses in other 
states and give at least some effect to another state's actions concerning 
the offense. General Laws, c. 90, §22, was amended by Acts of 1962, 
c. 261, to require the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a Massa-
chusetts resident's license when the resident has been convicted in an-
other state of operating under the influence of narcotic drugs and has 
had his right to operate in this other state suspended. 
§18.53. Motor vehicles: Junior operator's licenses for minors. The 
problem of the high accident rate of younger drivers recurs in many 
contexts, and numerous proposals have been made for various types 
of remedies. Acts of 1962, c. 687, adopts one of these proposals and, 
in effect, imposes a 1 :00 to 5:00 A.M. curfew on licensed drivers under 
eighteen years of age. Admitting that the problem is a very serious 
one, this particular solution seems undesirable. It imposes what may 
be in some cases a difficult limitation upon careful young drivers with-
out insuring that the high accident rate of young drivers as a group 
will be reduced. The legislation may be understandable as an experi-
ment but, unless it produces the result of reducing accidents of drivers 
in the age group covered, it should be reconsidered and other methods 
based upon better law enforcement and driver education applied. 
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N. LICENSING 
§I8.54. Discretion in denying licenses. In Turnpike Amusement 
Park, Inc. v. Licensing Commission of Cambridge,l the Supreme Judi-
cial Court had to determine if the defendant commission was entitled 
to refuse to license any pinball machines for a year's license period. 
General Laws, c. 140, §177A, provides, inter alia, that the licensing 
authority "may grant ... a license to keep and operate an automatic 
amusement device," including pinball machines. The Court held that 
the defendant commission exceeded its discretionary authority in the 
blanket denial of any pinball licenses. Each application had to be 
considered upon its own merits. In turn, however, the Court rejected 
the plaintiff's contention that the only standard of judgment was 
whether the applicant was a proper person to be licensed. The use 
of "may grant" in the statute indicates that the local authority may 
properly consider all moral and welfare problems that might be cre-
ated by the issuance of pinball licenses. The statute, while accepting 
pinball machines as valid devices, cannot be read as suggesting that 
all requests by proper persons must be granted. The discretion given 
to the licensing board is sufficiently broad so that all pertinent police 
power factors may be considered. 
In Silverman v. Board of Registration in Optometry,2 the Court 
upheld a board rule that licenses to practice optometry will not be 
granted for a location in which "a commercial or mercantile establish-
ment is the primary business being conducted." The Court found in 
G.L., c. 112, §67, broad powers to govern "the practice of optometry," 
and refused to limit this phrase to the regulation of the relationship 
of optometrist and patient. 
The plaintiff also contended that, if the regulation is valid under 
the statute, it is unconstitutional as being beyond the state's police 
power. This contention was rejected by the Court, on the basis that 
the regulation may fairly be interpreted as a method of avoiding the 
vice of commercialism in the profession, in the same sense that no-
advertising regulations are sustained. The Court stated it was not 
concerned with the wisdom of the regulation but merely its reasonable-
ness. The prohibition against location in commercial establishments 
may reasonably be construed to tend toward the maintenance of pro-
fessional standards. 
§I8.55. License revocation proceeding: Procedure. Harris v. Board 
of Registration in Chiropody (Podiatry) 1 upheld, with some hesitation, 
the manner of adoption and the type of rules adopted by the defend-
ant board for the conduct of its hearings, but found that the actual 
hearing given to the petitioner was not impartial. The board had 
revoked the petitioner'S license after a hearing at which a marked lack 
§18.54. 1343 Mass. 435, 179 N.E.2d 1122 (1962), also noted in §12.14 supra. 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 5117,181 N.E.2d 540, also noted in §12.9 supra. 
§18.55. 13411 Mass. 5116, 179 N.E.2d 910 (1962), also noted in §12.11 supra. 
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of decorum existed. If the atmosphere was partly the result of the 
comments of the petitioner and his lawyer, it was also in part the re-
sult of the board's lack of understanding of the legal points involved 
and the acrimony of at least one of the members. The Court did not 
have to determine if the manner of conducting the hearing would 
alone call for a reversal, however, since it had additional grounds in 
the consideration by the board of evidence, or at least a suggestion, of 
misconduct in addition to that charged by the specifications, and the 
consideration of testimony at a prior informal hearing without ade-
quate notice being given the petitioner. 
The regulations of the board designed to govern hearings before it 
were not adopted until after the petitioner had already received his 
first notice of a hearing against him. The board did not give notice 
or a chance to be heard in respect of the adoption of its rules, which 
was within its authority, but the Court at least indicated its belief 
that an opportunity to be heard should have been given, even if fail-
ure to do so did not amount to an error of law. The Court felt the 
regulations adopted were "scarcely adequate to serve the purposes" 
contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the 
petitioner not prejudiced by "their insignificance." 
Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn. v. State Racing 
Commission2 upheld the decision of respondent commission as to the 
number of racing days it authorized for the petitioner. The case, un-
der the same name, had been before the Court earlier, in which it 
held that the commission's procedure was inadequate and its decision 
un.supported by adequate findings of subsidiary facts. 3 The present 
decision of the commission was held to be in full compliance with this 
prior opinion. 
§18.56. Hawkers and peddlers. In an important decision the Su-
preme Judicial Court held the hawkers and peddlers licensing provi-
sions, G.L., c. 10, §22, unconstitutional as applied to a bakery that 
conducted a house-to-house business. In Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. 
Commissioner of Labor and Industries1 the Court found that the bak-
ing business being conducted by the plaintiff was basically so similar 
to the usual home delivery dairy business that the licensing require-
ment - and the high license fees - constituted an unreasonable dis-
crimination. The Court did, however, reject the bakery's contention 
that its business was not of a type that could be regulated by a licens-
ing statute, since it is inherently different in nature from similar busi-
nesses conducted from a fixed location. The case is thus limited in its 
holding to the type of business conducted by the plaintiff and does not 
relieve bakery businesses that may be conducted in different manners 
from the statutory coverage. 
The hawkers and peddlers act was also amended during the year by 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1195,184 N.E.2d 38, also noted in §12.l2 supra. 
8 Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn. v. State Racing Commis· 
sion,342 Mass. 694, 175 N.E.2d 244 (1961). 
§18.56. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1203.184 N.E.2d 344. 
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Acts of 1962, c. 541, which adds a new Section 22A to C.L., c. 101. 
The new section forbids the issuance of a license for the mobile sale 
of prepared, ready-to-eat foods, unless the business preparing the food 
has been licensed by the Department of Public Health under C.L., 
c. 94, §305C.2 
O. AUTHORITIES 
§18.57. Audit. Acts of 1962, c. 733, amends C.L., c. II, §12, to add 
to the list of entities to be audited by the state auditor the various 
authorities and districts created by the legislature. This act goes far 
to provide for public disclosure of the activities of these agencies. Ar-
guments concerning this legislation seem to have taken on the colora-
tion of the way persons feel about the Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority and its chairman. The issue is much broader, however, and 
really reaches to the question of the amount of public disclosure to be 
required by any agency or corporation that has obtained its full power 
from the Commonwealth and that performs functions that are nor-
mally those of the Commonwealth. 
§18.58. State labor laws. Acts of 1962, c. 760, was another piece of 
legislation also interpreted by many as directed against the Turnpike 
Authority. It provides that this authority, along with the Port, Park-
ing and Steamship Authorities, is bound by the provision of the state 
law on labor relations, C.L., c. 150A. The pertinent sections require 
collective bargaining, define unfair labor practices, govern certification 
and entitle parties to a review procedure. 
§18.59. Metropolitan Transit Authority. Public interest in the 
operations of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority may be quite 
general, but this interest is limited compared to the public'S interest 
in the Metropolitan Transit Authority. The great interest is reflected 
in considerable legislation as well as one case of considerable impor-
tance. 
In Hansen v. Commonwealth 1 the Supreme Judicial Court, in sus-
taining a restraining order against a strike or work stoppage by mem-
bers of the M.T.A. carmen's union local, held that the carmen were 
public employees. This determination removed the lower court's ac-
tion from the restraints of the state Anti-Injunction Act, C.L., c. 214, 
§9, and the three-judge requirement of C.L., c. 212, §30. The actual 
decision upheld the adjudgment of contempt against eight members 
of the union who had refused to work. The major importance of this 
case lies in its determination that the M.T.A.'s functions are suffic;iently 
2 A large number of changes in licensing provisions were adopted by the legisla-
ture during the 1962 SURVEY year. The more important ones are as follows: Acts 
of 1962. c. 521. regulating pesticides; Acts of 1962. c. 500. governing appeals on the 
granting by local licensing authorities of liquor licenses; Acts of 1962. c. 670. regu-
lating collection agencies; Acts of 1962, c. 775, requiring one-year residence for a 
real estate broker'S license. 
§18.59. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657,181 N.E.2d 845. 
37
Huber: Chapter 18: State and Municipal Government
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
§18.59 STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 261 
public in nature so that its employees are public employees. While 
the opinion does not suggest that the employees of all state-created 
authorities would be so designated, it at least points out the need for 
a re-evaluation of each authority's function in the light of the prin-
ciples held determinative. 
Arising from the same dispute that gave rise to the Hansen case, 
Acts of 1962, c. 307, gives the Governor extensive powers to declare 
an emergency in the M.T.A:s operations and take over management 
for up to forty-five days. 
The need for conforming M.T.A. procedures to those typical of 
agencies more directly governmental resulted in the enactment of three 
acts during the 1962 SURVEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 319, requires the 
trustees to submit an annual estimate of income and expenditures to 
the members of the advisory board. The open meeting law was made 
applicable to the meetings of the M.T.A. trustees by the amendment 
of G.L., c. 30A, §llA, by Acts of 1962, c. 331. Acts of 1962, c. 660, 
requires the trustees of the M.T.A. to award contracts for supplies, 
materials, equipment and services to the lowest responsible bidder, 
after advertising, unless certain prescribed conditions exist. Conces-
sions and leases are to be awarded to the highest responsible bidder. 
Acts of 1962, cc. 592 and 650, regulated the borrowing of the State 
Treasurer in anticipation of the receipt of assessments against cities 
and towns in the M.T.A. district. 
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